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Abstract1
This paper studies liberalized grain markets in Madagascar and examines how pro-
perty rights are protected and contracts are enforced among agricultural traders. We ﬁnd
that the incidence of theft and breach of contract is low and that the losses resulting from
such instances are small. This, however, does not result from reliance on legal institutions
-- actual recourse to police and courts is fairly rare, except in cases of theft -- but from
traders’ reluctance to expose themselves to malfeasance. As a result, Malagasy grain
trade has high transactions costs and little or no forward contracting. The dominant con-
tract enforcement mechanism is trust-based relationships. Trust is established primarily
through repeated interaction with little role for referral by other traders. Information on
bad clients does not circulate widely, hence severely limiting group punishments for non
payment.
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Europe, the fundamental role that market institutions play in economic growth has
become increasingly recognized. In particular, North argued that individual property
rights need to be protected from theft and embezzlement as well as from arbitrary
expropriation by agents of the state (e.g., Cooter (1997)). In addition, institutions such as
lawyers and courts must exist that ensure compliance with contractual obligations and
deter opportunistic breach of contract (e.g., Posner (1998)).2 These ideas have largely
shaped the research and policy agenda for transition economies and developing countries
alike (e.g., Merryman (1977), Benson (1990), Baer and Gray (1995), Hendley, Murrell
and Ryterman (1998), McMillan (1996), Fafchamps (1996)). They have also spawn new
and insightful research in the various forms that market institutions have taken over the
course of human history (e.g., Ensminger (1992), Greif (1993, 1994), Milgrom, North and
Weingast (1991)).
This paper studies whether institutions exist in present day Madagascar that protect
property rights and ensure contract compliance among grain traders. Madagascar is a
particularly suitable place to study market institutions at early stages of development
because, until recently, grain trade was entirely under state control (e.g., Barrett (1997a,
1997b), Dorosh and Bernier (1994), Berg (1989)). At the same time, the island has kept
much of the French legal code and judicial system that it inherited from colonisation.
Malagasy commercial law may be a little dated, not having been overhauled since
independence (e.g., The World Bank (1995) Root (1993)). But it is likely to be quite
superior to the legal environment that prevails in most transitional economies. Liberal-
ized grain trade in Madagascar thus constitutes an interesting test case of the role of law
per se in the development of efﬁcient markets and it provides a unique window on the
early development of markets when laws are not too inadequate3 but their implementa-
tion leaves much to be desired. An analysis of the functioning of Madagascar grain mark-
ets should therefore supply useful insights on the likely effect of legal reform in transition
economies at a similar level of development.
Using data from a trader survey that we designed and collected ourselves, we show
that the incidence of theft and breach of contract is low among Malagasy grain traders
and that the losses resulting from such instances are small. At prima facie these results
suggest that market institutions work well. A closer look at the evidence, however,
reveals that low incidence of theft and contractual breach is achieved essentially through
low exposure. Theft is rare because many traders do not stock the goods they sell and, if
they do, they go to great length ensuring that their stocks are protected -- e.g., by sleeping
in their store. Econometric analysis conﬁrms that overnight storage is a signiﬁcant risk
factor in theft incidence. Among those to transport grain from town to town, payment of
protection money and travel in convoy are common -- presumably against the risk of
ambush that is endemic in certain parts of the country. Surveyed traders even declare
refraining from hiring additional workers for fear of employee-related theft.
The situation regarding contract compliance is similar. Malagasy traders limit their
exposure to potential breach of contract by adopting commercial practices that leave
_ ______________
2 Messick (1999), however, cautions that little hard evidence exists on the relationship between good
legal institutions and development.
3 Even if somewhat outdated and contradictory.2 
little room for abuse. Most transactions take a simple cash-and-carry form. Supplier
credit is infrequent, and the placement of orders is uncommon. Payment by check and
invoicing are virtually unheard of. Traders personally inspect the quality of goods pur-
chased in nearly all transactions. Econometric analysis indicates that exposure is the
dominant risk factor in all cases of contractual breach.
Survey results further show that recourse to legal institutions is rare, but that it
increases with the severity of the dispute. The use of police and courts is indeed highest
in theft cases and lowest in late delivery and deﬁcient quality cases, with non-payment
by clients in between. Direct negotiation with the other party is the dominant conﬂict
resolution method in contractual disputes. Traders’ propensity to solve disputes and to
resume trade with each other is shown to depend critically on the use of direct negotia-
tions with the other party. Recourse to negotiations in turn depends on the strength of the
relationship between trading partners. These results are broadly similar to those reported
by Bigsten et al. (1999) for African manufacturing. They conﬁrm Fafchamps and
Minten’s (1999a) earlier conclusion that relationships play an important role in the reso-
lution of contractual disputes among Malagasy traders.
Finding that legal institutions do not play an important role in the enforcement of
contracts begs the question of which alternative mechanism is used by Malagasy traders.
Our analysis suggest that trust-based relationships are the dominant contract enforcement
mechanism among grain traders. Trust is established primarily through repeated interac-
tion with little role for referral by other traders. Information on bad clients does not cir-
culate widely, hence severely limiting group punishments for non payment. The lack of
information sharing does not result from the existence of linguistic, ethnic, or religious
obstacles to communication. Rather, it may be due to the disruption of pre-existing Asian
networks following food riots in the late 1980’s (e.g., Blanchy (1995)). Why native net-
works did not emerge in their stead remains a mystery, however.
To summarize, grain trade in Madagascar has little in common with the sophisti-
cated business world that proponents of market liberalization typically envision. With lit-
tle or no forward contracting, no brand recognition, and no returns to scale in distribu-
tion, it resembles more the occasional ﬂea markets of Californian cities than the organ-
ized grain markets of the American mid-West. Although the direct costs of theft and con-
tractual breach appear low, the methods that surveyed traders use to minimize risk expo-
sure can but add to transactions costs. The need for traders to personally inspect quality
on each delivery, for instance, combined with their unwillingness to delegate quality con-
trol to subordinates and with their reluctance to hire additional workers for fear of theft,
undoubtedly restrict ﬁrm size and ﬁrm growth. The need to guard stocks in person, the
total absence of payment by check (that adds to the risk of theft), the infrequent use of
trade credit, and the difﬁculty of placing orders complicate the conduct of business and
make trade very labor and management intensive.
The transactions costs of trade are ultimately paid by producers and consumers in
the form of a larger spread between farm-gate and retail price (e.g., IFPRI (1998)). The
welfare cost of imperfect markets is thus not negligible. In addition, judging from the
extreme dispersion in ﬁrm size (Gini coefﬁcient of total sales around 0.75) and the fact
that better connected traders economize on transactions costs and reap higher sales and
proﬁts (e.g., Fafchamps and Minten (1999a)), it is far from clear that competition yields
efﬁciency. Indeed, Fafchamps and Minten’s (1999b) ﬁnding that traders with better social3 
network capital make more proﬁts suggest that they do not take advantage of their lower
costs to drive out small, unconnected traders. In other words, in a ﬂea market economy,
the coexistence of a large number of atomistic ﬁrms with a small number of large, well
connected traders should not be taken as an indication that competitive forces are
sufﬁcient to eliminate rents (see Barrett (1997b) for a similar observation). This is
because, among other things, small traders’ efforts to protect their property rights and
avoid being cheated leads to high transactions costs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 1 with a discus-
sion of our conceptual framework and the institutional environment prevailing in
Madagascar. Next, in Section 2, we present a brief description of the surveys. Section 3
follows with an analysis of the incidence of theft and breach of contract. Regression
analysis is presented that tries to identify their determinants. Deterrence and contract
enforcement mechanisms are discussed in Section 4. Conclusions are presented at the
end.
Section 1. Conceptual Framework and Institutional Environment
To ascertain whether an institution protects property rights, we must ﬁrst understand
what leads individuals to use the institution in order to obtain remedy for malfeasance
(e.g., Becker (1968)). Formal legal institutions are powerless to deter malfeasance unless
victims voluntarily seek their protection by reporting crime to authorities and by bringing
legal suit against opportunistic breach of contract. If victims fail to seek redress from the
law, the threat of formal sanction is not credible and legal deterrence is vacuous (e.g.,
Becker and Stigler (1974)).4
For a victim to involve legal institutions in the resolution of crimes and contractual
disputes, the anticipated beneﬁts from legal action must outweigh the costs. At least four
economic factors affect the net expected utility gain from legal recourse: (1) the actual
cost of legal action, including lawyers’ fees, bribes to agents of authority, and the oppor-
tunity cost of the plaintiff’s time; (2) the expected time delay before compensation is
received, which in turn depends on the speed with which legal institutions handle their
case load; (3) the uncertainty surrounding expected compensation, which is a function of
the ease with which perpetrators can be brought to justice, the ambiguity of the case, the
availability of evidence, the impartiality of judges and police ofﬁcers, and the impreci-
sion of the law and jurisprudence; and (4) the fear of reprisal from the other party, which
itself depends on the effectiveness of the incarceration system and the state’s zeal in pun-
ishing reprisal. Other important but perhaps less rational motivations for legal action
include emotions such as the anger or shame that victims may experience as a result of
malfeasance, and that may induce or refrain them from seeking legal redress.
It should be clear that no actual legal system, even the most efﬁcient, can ever be
exempt of all the above problems. Adjudicating justice takes time and effort as outsiders
have to be informed of the circumstances of the case and strict procedures have to be fol-
lowed to ensure that both parties are treated fairly. There will, therefore, always be situa-
tions in which victims of malfeasance choose not to call upon the law. Consequently, it is
illusory to expect legal institutions to ever perfectly deter all opportunistic behavior.5
_ ______________
4 Except for its possible effect on ethical standards and social norms.
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Keeping these caveats in mind, however, the state of legal institutions appears
unusually bad in Madagascar. A recent attitudinal survey conducted under the auspices
of the Ministry of Justice of Madagascar shows that Malagasy people have little
conﬁdence in their justice system (Ministère de la Justice (1999)). They are also have lit-
tle understanding of how courts operate, which may lead them to blame the respect of
legal procedures on corruption and incompetence (ibidem). Although detailed factual
evidence is not available, several authors nevertheless note the existence of sizeable side
payments required by police to pursue thieves, the size of which occasionally exceed the
value of stolen goods themselves (e.g., La Lettre de l’Ocean Indien (31/07/1999).6 It is
apparently common practice for court clerks to request large sums of money to issue
copies of court judgement, copies without which foreclosure is impossible (e.g.,
La Lettre de l’Ocean Indien (31/07/1999), Ministère de la Justice (1999)). Other docu-
mented forms of corruption include that of judges, although the frequency of occurrence
remains unclear. In addition, the Malagasy justice system is slow. The usual time lag
required for a court case to be brought to completion is unusually high -- 4 to 5 years --
and judges appear unwilling to resist delaying tactics by defenders (e.g.,
The World Bank (1991)).
A lot of uncertainties surround the outcome of legal action in general, in part
because of contradictions in the law, insufﬁcient number of legal books, and corrupt
judges (e.g., Root (1993), The World Bank (1995), Ministère de la Justice (1999)). But
for simple cases such as theft and non-payment of purchased goods, the major source of
uncertainty is likely to be the availability of evidence, not the law. What may also be a
signiﬁcant source of uncertainty, at least in certain regions, is the difﬁculty to locate and
arrest criminals, given the absence of an identity card system,7 the lack of roads, and the
general insecurity prevailing in parts of the country (most notably the area surrounding
the coastal city of Majunga). Fear of reprisal is also present and is obviously fed by the
well documented practice of letting prisoners out of jail in exchange for bribes (e.g,
Dodwell (1995), La Lettre de l’Ocean Indien (31/07/1999), Ministère de la Justice
(1999)).8 Although it is unclear whether freed prisoners actually seek retribution from
their accuser, the prevailing sentiment in Madagascar is that people are not adequately
protected from thieves and criminals. The World Bank (1995) further reports that
’foreign and domestic private investors [interviewed in a survey] almost unanimously
pointed to the absence of the "rule of law" as a major impediment to doing business in
Madagascar’ (page x).
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6 Ramiarantsoa (1995), for instance, reports the case of a victim of a manioc theft who ended up paying
eight times the value of the stolen goods to cover transport and food costs for himself and the apprehended
thieves.
7 In 1998, there was an agreement in the National Assembly to establish an identity card system, mainly
for electoral purposes. We do not know whether this reform was subsequently implemented.
8 By itself, this evidence is insufﬁcient to conclude that the Malagasy detention system is not harsh
enough to deter crime. We suspect incarceration to be extremely hard for most prisoners, as suggested by
the claim that inmates either have to purchase their food from guardians or must bring their own. In
practice, it is likely that only a handful of prisoners bribe their way out of jail, while the others suffer in
silence. This is also the impression that transpires from the attitudinal survey reported in Ministère de la
Justice (1999).5 
To summarize, the existing literature unanimously ﬁnds Malagasy legal institutions
wanting. Much of the available evidence, however, is in the form of anecdotes and horror
stories, on the basis of which it is notoriously dangerous to generalize. The attitudinal
survey results presented in Ministère de la Justice (1999) tell a dismal tale of distrust in
the legal system, but only reports popular beliefs, not actual fact. Hard evidence on
recourse to legal institutions by victims of malfeasance is missing. One purpose of this
paper is to ﬁll this lacuna.
Before moving to the actual data, it is important to realize that the ineffectiveness of
legal institutions, if true, is likely to have two effects: preventive action, and recourse to
alternative contract enforcement institutions. Prevention can take many forms -- guarding
goods susceptible of theft, avoiding contractual practices that leave room for opportunis-
tic breach -- but it is costly. Costs can be direct -- a guardian’s wage -- or indirect --
inconvenient business practices. A rational agent would engage in preventive action only
if the expected utility loss from malfeasance exceeds the costs of prevention. The actual
cost of preventive action thus provides a lower bound estimate of the expected utility loss
from malfeasance.9 In other words, if we observe that economic agents go to great
lengths to reduce their exposure to opportunistic behavior, this constitutes prima facie
evidence that the risk of malfeasance is high.10 This is true even if prevention keeps the
actual frequency of malfeasance low.
Given that prevention is costly and inconvenient, economic agents may establish
informal means of enforcing contracts. Several such mechanisms have been discussed in
the literature (e.g., Charny (1990), Ellickson (1991)). They include: guilt (e.g., Platteau
(1994)); strong-armed enforcement (e.g., Gambetta (1993), Braguinsky (1999)), long-
term relationships between two agents (e.g., Greif (1993), Winn (1994), Ghosh and Ray
(1996), Fafchamps (1998)), and joint punishments based on information sharing within
business communities (e.g., Bernstein (1992), Posner (1996), Kandori (1992), Greif
(1993), Fafchamps (1998)). Without going through the details of each of these alternative
institutions, they all share the idea that compliance with contractual obligations or social
norms is achieved if the expected value of punishment exceeds the gain from opportun-
ism.11 If these conditions are satisﬁed, prevention is no longer necessary and more ela-
borate contracts become feasible. So, for instance, when an agent deals with someone he
knows and trust, he might be more willing to accept delayed payment, simplify the
veriﬁcation of quality, and generally believe what the other person says. Long-term rela-
tionships, reinforced or not by community-level sanctions, can thus form the basis of an
alternative method of enforcement grounded in trust (e.g., Gambetta (1988), Fukuyama
(1995)). The difference with reliance on legal institutions is that trust is selective and
_ ______________
9 Ignoring possible negative externalities, i.e., prevention by one agent diverts malfeasance towards
other agents.
10 Whenever the risk of malfeasance is very high and/or the cost of prevention is prohibitive, particular
activities may not take place at all -- corner solution. Traders, for instance, may refrain from buying and
selling in insecure regions altogether, and farming in remote areas may be totally discouraged if farmers
are incapable of protecting crops in the ﬁeld. Fear of theft has been suggested to account for lack of trade,
the poor maintenance of plantations, and the early harvesting of coffee in certain regions of Madagascar
(e.g., Minten, Randrianarisoa and Zeller (1998), The World Bank (1999)).
11 A simple modeling framework incorporating multiple punishment strategies is presented, for
instance, in Fafchamps (1996).6 
personalized: not all agents are treated in the same manner, and agents lower their guard
only with individuals they know personally. Thus, the fact that agents take more chances
with agents they know better can be taken as evidence that informal, relationship-based
enforcement mechanisms play an important role in deterring malfeasance. In the absence
of such relationships, prevention is the foldback option. The role of relationships is
emphasized by the authors of the Ministère de la Justice (1999) report, who write on page
27 that ’Because the courts are seen as expensive, slow, corrupt, and unpredictable, the
[Malagasy] business community prefers to negotiate conﬂicts to resolution.’
One important corollary of the above is that, if recourse to legal institutions is not
the primary mode of dispute resolution, disputes need not be resolved according to legal
principles. For instance, contract law typically calls for one party to compensate the other
in case of breach. In other words, breach of contract is regarded as a fault that requires
reparation. Parties to a long-term relationship may ﬁnd such approach incompatible with
the need to maintain goodwill and friendship because assigning fault to one party and
calling for compensation is antagonistic and may endanger the relationship. Conse-
quently, cases of contractual breach resolved through informal enforcement are expected
to yield different outcomes from those enforced by courts. For one thing, parties will
probably show more understanding for each other difﬁculties and be more willing to
implicitly insure each other for unanticipated contingencies. Flexibility in execution is
thus a likely feature of contracts enforced by the threat of losing a business relationship
(e.g., Bigsten et al. (1999)). By the same token, cases of breach among acquaintances are
more likely to be resolved to the satisfaction of the parties and less likely to sever the
relationship.
If the above interpretation is correct, the ﬂexibility made possible by long-term rela-
tionships might lead to the apparent contradiction that breach of contract is more fre-
quent among parties who know each other well. The reason is that parties to such rela-
tionships lower their guard, hence making more room for breach, while at the same time
ensuring that most cases of breach are handled in a ﬂexible and relation-preserving
manner. In such cases, non-compliance with contract terms should not be regarded as
evidence of opportunistic behavior but rather as a manifestation of ﬂexibility and compli-
city between trusting partners.
Having clariﬁed our conceptual framework and discussed the available evidence on
the Malagasy legal system, we are now ready to look at microeconomic evidence on mal-
feasance and its remedies among Malagasy grain traders.
Section 2. The Data
A survey of agricultural traders was conducted in Madagascar in a joint project
between IFPRI (the International Food Policy Research Institute) and the local Ministry
of Scientiﬁc Research (FOFIFA). The ﬁrst round of interviews were held between May
1997 and August 1997 and collected information on the individual characteristics of
traders and on the structure, conduct, and performance of the trading sector. A second
interview was conducted between September 1997 and November 1997; it focused on
the nature of respondents’ relationships with other traders, clients, and suppliers.
The sample design was constructed so as to be as representative as possible of all
the traders involved in the whole food marketing chain from producer to consumer,
wherever located. Three main agricultural regions were covered (Fianarantsoa, Majunga,7 
and Antananarivo) and the sampling frame within these regions was set up so as to cover
traders operating at three different levels:
(1) Traders operating in big and small urban markets in the main town of every pro-
vince (faritany) and district (ﬁvondronana). These traders are mostly wholesalers,
semi-wholesalers, and retailers.
(2) Urban traders located outside the regular markets. These often are bigger traders,
processors (e.g., rice millers), and wholesalers.
(3) Traders operating on rural markets at the level of the rural county (ﬁraisana). These
are mostly big and small assemblers and itinerant traders. Rural ﬁraisanas were
selected through stratiﬁed sampling based on agro-ecological characteristics so as to
be representative of the various kind of marketed products and marketing seasons.
The survey focused on traders that marketed locally consumed staples such as rice,
cassava, potatoes, beans, and peanuts. The different forms in which these products are
marketed were taken into consideration, i.e., paddy and milled rice, maize and maize
ﬂour, etc. Traders involved primarily in export crops, fruits, vegetables, and minor crops
were excluded. Most surveyed traders -- 67% -- report rice as the agricultural product
they trade most intensively. This reﬂects the importance of rice as the main staple food in
the country. Other most actively traded products are beans and lentils (18% of the sample
report them as their main traded product), cassava (5%), potatoes (5%), peanuts (4%),
and maize (2%).
A total number of 850 traders were surveyed in the ﬁrst visit, 739 of whom were
surveyed again in the second visit. The analysis presented here is based on traders that
could be located in the two visits.12 The main characteristics of respondents are summar-
ized in Table 1. Total sales measures output. Value added, deﬁned as the difference
between the value of total sales and total purchases, represents total returns to labor,
management, and capital. As suggested by the presence of large standard deviations,
these averages hide extreme variation in traders’ size of operation: the coefﬁcients of
variation of sales and value added are 2.6 and 3.7, respectively. The corresponding Gini
coefﬁcients are 0.761 and 0.702. Expressed in percentage of annual sales, the average
trade margin is 15%. Assuming that grain changes hands four times between producer
and ﬁnal consumer, such margins translate into a consumer price on average 75% higher
than the farm-gate price (e.g., IFPRI (1998)). Margins of this magnitude are common in
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Detailed information is available on working capital and equipment (mostly weight-
ing equipment), storage capacity and vehicles, telephone usage, labor, management,
human capital, and social capital. The data show that the surveyed businesses are fairly
unsophisticated by western standards: average working capital is roughly equivalent to
2,000 US dollars -- a large number compared to the annual GDP of Madagascar which
was 230 US dollars in 1997, but very small compared to the turnover of grain trading
companies in the U.S. or Europe. The great majority of surveyed traders do not have their
own transportation equipment, nor do they use telephones very often. Each trading
_ ______________
12 The category of traders which were hardest to trace during the second visit are those who are least
formal and have the least permanent form of operation. As a result, small itinerant traders tend to be
underrepresented in the results reported here.8 
business has an average of four workers, including the owner/manager. Most respondents
work full time in trade and remain traders all year round. On average, they are fairly well
educated by Madagascar standards. In Madagascar trade is conducted in Malagasy, the
national language which is spoken throughout the island. French is commonly used in the
administration and in some (primarily urban) secondary schools. Close to half of the
respondents commonly speak a language other than Malagasy -- mostly French. Informa-
tion was also collected on various dimensions of the respondents’ social network: the
number of close relatives in agricultural trade; the number of (non-family) traders that
respondents know; the number of friends and family members who can help the business
stay aﬂoat in times of trouble; and the number of suppliers and clients that respondents
know personally. Fafchamps and Minten (1999b) examine how these different forms of
social network capital affect ﬁrm performance.
Data are also available on the way traders deal with each other. On average, sur-
veyed traders buy and sell mostly in cash. Invoicing and the use of checks are virtually
unheard of. A small but non-negligible proportion of traders nevertheless manage to
receive and grant trade credit -- 15.8% and 13.6% of total grain purchases and sales,
respectively -- typically for one week. Since respondents rotate their working capital
several times per month, even short term credit can signiﬁcantly add to their buying
capacity. Surveyed traders do part of their business with regular suppliers and clients,
with whom they are more likely to place orders and receive or grant credit and less likely
to inspect quality. This conforms with theoretical expectations according to which rela-
tionships facilitate contract enforcement (e.g., Ghosh and Ray (1996), Kranton (1996),
Fafchamps (1998a), and the discussion in Section 1).
Section 3. Incidence of Theft and Breach of Contract
Table 2 summarizes the incidence of theft and breach of contract in the twelve
months preceding the survey. Only a small proportion of traders were victim of theft and
the total value of stolen goods accounted for less that 0.3% of total annual sales.
Incidence appeared much higher for a handful of respondents, but we cannot rule out the
possibility of error in data collection. Of 56 instances of recent thefts, 23 took place at
the trader’s store during the day, 23 took place at night, 7 during transport, and 3 while
the goods were in the hands of third parties (Table 3). Not all thefts are equally costly,
however: the average value of stolen goods is on average nine times higher for thefts at
night or during transport. In a third of theft cases, respondents were conﬁdent that
employees were not responsible; in the rest of the cases, respondents either suspected
employees or were unsure. Not surprisingly, traders who suspect employees are those
with more employees -- 7.7 vs. 3.4 among those respondents who do not suspect their
workforce. Pilferage by employees is thus is a concern of surveyed traders, especially
large ones.
Breaches of contract are somewhat more prevalent, but they too affect only a minor-
ity of survey respondents (Table 2). The proportions of sales and purchases affected by
breach of contract are all less than 5% on average, although they are much higher for
some traders. Deﬁcient quality and late payment are the most often cited problems,
affecting a ﬁfth and a third of traders, respectively. But their implied cost is only a frac-
tion of the value of the transaction -- e.g., the loss in value due to inferior quality and the
opportunity cost of capital in case of late payment. The same is true for late delivery.9 
Non payment, a much more severe form of breach of contract, is quite rare and affects
only 0.04% of all transactions. These ﬁndings are similar though more pronounced than
those reported by Fafchamps (1996) and Bigsten et al. (1999).
Judging from these numbers, the direct costs of theft and breach of contract are
quite small -- less than one percent of annual sales on average.13 Some traders occasion-
ally suffer more severe losses, however, especially when goods are stolen at night or dur-
ing transport. On the basis of these numbers, one may be tempted to conclude that the
rule of law prevails in Madagascar and that malfeasance is adequately deterred by exist-
ing legal institutions. This is in apparent contradiction with the fact that 64% of the 364
individuals interviewed by the Ministère de la Justice (1999) listed theft as their number
one public safety concern and that the majority of them did not trust police and courts to
provide sufﬁcient protection. A closer inspection of the evidence suggests, however, a
possible reconciliation: the low incidence of malfeasance owes more to prevention by
traders than to legal deterrence. Surveyed traders indeed go to great lengths to minimize
the risk of theft and breach of contract. Table 3 lists some of the measures surveyed
traders take to minimize theft. Over a third of respondents declare refraining from hiring
additional workers for fear of employee theft. The magnitude of this ﬁgure -- and its
likely welfare cost in an economy where underemployment is rampant and trade is a
major source of employment -- perfectly illustrates the idea that the indirect costs of mal-
feasance are potentially much larger than its direct costs (see Hart (1988) for a similar
observation). Table 3 also shows that, among traders who stock agricultural products at
night, two third sleep on the premises. Virtually all overnight storage is both locked and
guarded. Of those traders who transport goods from one town to another, 43% either pay
for protection or travel in convoy.14 In addition, thirteen traders -- all from the same pro-
vince (Fianarantsoa) -- declare avoiding certain routes for fear of bandits.
A similar picture emerges for quality control. Table 4 indicates that prices vary with
product quality. For instance, the price differential between the two most traded rice
qualities oscillate between 8% and 9% in the capital city. Some of this quality variation
is due to differences in traditional crop varieties across regions.15 This source of quality
variation can presumably be controled by traders simply by verifying the geographical
origin of the goods they buy. Some of the variation in quality, however, does not come
from regional differences but from improper handling16 and from natural variation in
traditional seed material, thereby making it harder to ascertain. Taken together, the evi-
dence indicates that price varies with quality and that quality cannot be perfectly inferred
by a product’s region of origin. As table 4 shows, the overwhelming majority of surveyed
_ ______________
13 Estimated from Table 2 assuming that losses from late delivery and late payment account for at most
10% of the value of sales and that losses from deﬁcient quality account for at most 5% of sales value. With
these generous assumptions, total losses amount to 0.89% of total sales -- 0.28% from theft, 0.04% from
non-payment, 0.16% from late delivery, 0.22% from deﬁcient quality, and 0.19% from late payment.
Recovered goods are not subtracted from loss from theft.
14 Interestingly, only two traders report doing both.
15 Unlike in advanced economies where most food is produced from a handful of highly homogeneous
improved seeds, farmers in Madagascar as well as in much of the tropics rely on their own output for
seeds. This process results in widespread dispersion in genetic traits and output characteristics across
regions and even villages.
16 E.g., high moisture content, fungus and pest damage, brokens, presence of stones and sand.10 
traders and their clients respond to quality risk by inspecting each and every purchase.
The importance of quality inspection is further underscored by the fact that the task is
virtually never delegated to family helpers, employees, or collecting agents. Although we
did not attempt to measure the time actually spent on quality veriﬁcation by Malagasy
traders, casual observation suggests that the process can be very time consuming. Furth-
ermore it requires that the trader be present at each purchase, thereby complicating the
conduct of business and requiring extensive travel on the part of the trader. A similar pat-
tern is observed with respect to other sources of breach of contract: 85% of surveyed
traders never place orders from suppliers; and 54% never give credit to customers. In
addition, payment by check is unheard of; all transactions are strictly cash.17 Although
such practices presumably reduce contractual risk, they complicate transactions and the
planning of business.
However costly, these efforts are in general effective in minimizing the incidence of
malfeasance. As indicated by Table 5, simple t tests indicate that not storing overnight
virtually eliminates the risk of theft. Not placing orders cancels the risk of late delivery,
and not giving credit to clients dramatically reduce the risks of late and non payment.
The results reported in Table 5 may, however, be unreliable because they ignore the
effect of other possible determinants of malfeasance, such as regional differences in
incidence, and the likely endogeneity of prevention.
We therefore complement the bivariate analysis reported in Table 5 with a mul-
tivariate regression analysis that controls for possible endogeneity. Results regarding
theft are presented in Table 6.18 The dependent variable is the value of annual losses due
to theft as a proportion of annual sales. The ﬁrst column examines the determinants of
theft incidence without conditioning on risky behavior. Explanatory variables include
total sales (to control for size), human capital (measured by years of schooling and the
log of years of trade experience), and location dummies. Presumably, larger ﬁrms may
experience more theft because they process a larger volume of goods and ﬁnd it harder to
control their employees. Total sales are instrumented to control for the possible feedback
effect that theft may have on sales.19 Human capital is included to control for the possi-
bility that smarter, more experienced traders might be better able to prevent theft. Loca-
tion variables control for general crime environment and other spatial effects. Insecurity
is generally perceived to be highest in the Majunga Plaines region and fairly high in the
Majunga Plateaux region.20 We would therefore expect theft to be more problematic in
these regions. Results show that ﬁrms that sell more face more theft. Other variables are
_ ______________
17 The use of check is absent even of credit transactions, presumably because Malagasy banks are
notoriously slow in processing payments and transfers. At the time of the survey, it allegedly took two to
three weeks for banks to transfer funds from agencies of the same bank located in two different towns.
18 To control for the possibility that results are driven by outliers (see large ’Maximum’ frequencies in
Table 2), all regressions on determinants of theft and breach of contract were reestimated after dropping all
frequencies larger than 10%. Qualitative results are unchanged, but estimated parameter are in general
smaller in magnitude.
19 The instrumenting equation is presented in appendix A. Instruments include various measures of
physical and working capital, labor and management, social network capital, entrepreneurial traits and
family background, and aggregate shocks. See Fafchamps and Minten (1999b) for more details.
20 Higher incidence of cattle and food crop theft is for instance reported for Majunga by Minten,
Randrianarisoa and Zeller (1998).11 
not signiﬁcant.
We then introduce risk factors such as overnight storage and storage capacity as
additional regressors (second column of Table 6). As expected, results show that traders
who store overnight are more at risk. The magnitude of the coefﬁcient is very large.
Storage capacity has the expected sign but its t value is below standard levels of
signiﬁcance. As anticipated, the risk of theft is much larger in the two Majunga regions,
and largest in the region where insecurity is generally perceived to be highest. Experi-
mentation with other regressors suggests that transporting raises theft incidence and that
sleeping in one’s store reduces it, but the effects are no longer signiﬁcant once location
dummies are included in the regression.21 To control for possible endogeneity, we then
instrument risky behavior variables and replace them by their predicted value.22 Results
are presented in the third column of Table 6. They conﬁrm that risky behavior raises the
incidence of theft. The effect of regional dummies is unchanged.
We run similar regressions for various forms of breach of contract. To control for
relationships, we include as additional regressors the (log of the) number of close rela-
tives in agricultural trade and the number of suppliers and clients known personally by
the respondent. Fafchamps and Minten (1999b) indeed demonstrate that better connected
traders not only make more proﬁts but also are more likely to place orders and to give
and receive trade credit. Following much of the literature (e.g., Fukuyama (1995), Kran-
ton (1996), Greif (1993), North (1990)), they hypothesize that social connections miti-
gate opportunism. Regional dummies are included to capture possible differences in road
infrastructure, climate, and other location speciﬁc factors. Road quality is best in and
around the capital city, and in Majunga Plaines; it is by far the worst in Majunga Pla-
teaux and also fairly low in Fianarantsoa. To the extent that late delivery is due to prob-
lems during transport, we would therefore expect late delivery to more prevalent in these
regions. Rainfall is most abundant in the Fianarantsoa Côtes et Falaises region and in
Vakinankaratra; it is lowest in Majunga (e.g., Oldeman (1990)). Since deﬁcient quality is
often related to imperfect drying, we would expect quality to be more problematic in
humid regions.
Regression results are presented in Tables 7 to 10. Except for the veriﬁcation of
quality, which has the right sign but is not statistically signiﬁcant,23 the coefﬁcients of all
risk factors have the right sign and are signiﬁcant. Contrary to expectations, traders with
family members in agricultural trade appear to face a higher incidence of contractual
breach. For deﬁcient quality and for non-payment, the effect is signiﬁcant even after we
control for risky behavior. This suggests that having more relatives in trade favors con-
tractual opportunism, presumably because traders ﬁnd it difﬁcult to discipline relatives
who operate as suppliers or clients. This may explain why Fafchamps and Minten
(1999b) ﬁnd that respondents with more relatives in agricultural trade get signiﬁcantly
lower proﬁts after controling for all factors and inputs. An alternative explanation is that
close relationships with relatives open more room for contractual ﬂexibility.
_ ______________
21 The fact that robust results are difﬁcult to obtain with more regressors is not altogether surprising
given that there are only 57 non-zero observations.
22 Instrumenting equations are presented in Appendix B. Instruments include personal wealth, age, and
sex of the owner, social network capital, personal traits, and family background.
23 Quality veriﬁcation is signiﬁcant when location dummies are omitted.12 
Results also indicate the presence of very strong regional differences in the
incidence of breach of contract, even after we control for urbanization level. Contrary to
expectations, however, we do not ﬁnd that regions with inferior road infrastructure have
more late delivery problems and that wetter regions have more deﬁcient quality cases. If
anything, Majunga Plateaux, the region with by far the poorest road infrastructure, has
less late delivery cases than other regions, and the Fianarantsoa Côtes et Falaises region,
which is the most humid, has fewer cases of deﬁcient quality. Results indicate that
Antananarivo and the region surrounding it (the omitted region dummy) have more late
delivery problems. One possible interpretation for this puzzling result is that, although
delivery problems are less severe around the capital, they are perceived with more acuity
because the capital city is a major food deﬁcit area where the urgency of demand is felt
more strongly than elsewhere. This issue deserves more research.
Contrary to expectations, econometric results do not suggest that quality problems
are more frequent in the most humid area, the Fianarantsoa Côtes et Falaises region. If
anything, quality deﬁciencies are highest in the Vakinankaratra and Antananarivo
regions (the omitted region dummy), two areas of moderate to high rainfall. In terms of
payment by clients, the incidence of breach of contract appears to be signiﬁcantly higher
in the rural areas surrounding the capital city. The reason for these regional differences is
unclear.24 One possibility is that they correspond to different equilibria of a ﬂexible con-
tract enforcement game. This issue deserves more research.
To summarize, we have shown that the incidence of theft and contractual breach is
low but also that Malagasy grain traders go to great length to reduce their exposure to
malfeasance. Regression analysis demonstrated that prevention is effective in the sense
that traders who opt for more risky trading practices face a higher incidence of malfea-
sance. The question now remains of why prevention is the dominant method grain traders
use to reduce risk. To answer this question, we now examine what happens when a theft
or a breach of contract actually occur.
Section 4. Legal Institutions and Deterrence
Recourse to the police is relatively frequent in cases of theft: as shown in Table 11,
one third of theft cases were reported to the police, and respondents went to court --
presumably as witnesses -- in ten percent of the theft cases. This ﬁnding is consistent
with the results from the attitudinal survey reported in Ministère de la Justice (1999),
where 31% of respondents stated they would contact the police if they were victim of
theft. Calling upon the police had no noticeable effect on the probability to recover stolen
item, however: of those traders who went to the police, 24% retrieved all or part of the
stolen goods; of those who did not, 34% retrieved something. The difference is not statist-
ically signiﬁcant (t value of 0.81). The small number of observations (57 cases of theft)
precludes further analysis.25
_ ______________
24 Differences in the function (e.g., collector, wholesaler, retailer, or microretailer) exercised by the
respondent or in the crops they sell, do not, for instance, account for these regional differences.
25 With such a small number of observations and no suitable instruments, it is impossible to control for
possible self-selection bias in the sense that traders may only go to the police if they cannot solve the theft
on their own. The lack of statistical difference in the resolution of cases brought to the police and those
handled by traders themselves does not, by itself, constitute sufﬁcient evidence that the police is
ineffective.13 
We have a little more information on contractual disputes with suppliers and clients.
Surveyed traders were asked whether they ever called upon an intermediary to mediate
their contractual disputes with suppliers or clients, and whether they ever went to the pol-
ice, a lawyer, or a court in relation with a purchase or sales dispute. Their responses,
listed in Table 11, show that, apart from an occasional recourse to the police, the use of
legal institutions by Malagasy grain traders is extremely low in contractual disputes with
suppliers and clients. These results are consistent with results from an attitudinal survey
reported in Ministère de la Justice (1999).
One conceivable interpretation of these numbers is that legal enforcement in
Madagascar is so effective and predictable that parties rationally anticipate the outcome
and prefer to settle beforehand to avoid litigation costs. Table 11 indeed indicates that
direct negotiations are the instrument of choice to resolve contractual disputes. Mediators
are used occasionally as well. But the data also show that the threat of recourse to the
police or to courts is extremely rare. In addition, these threats tend to be used only in
desperate circumstances. Of the eight cases in which a threat of police action was men-
tioned, for instance, ﬁve were for non-payment by a client. Finally, surveyed traders
hardly ever seek the advice of a lawyer. Taken together, these observations suggest that
the threat of court action is not an important deterrent of contractual opportunism in the
Malagasy grain market. Yet, lack of familiarity with courts and legal institutions does not
seem to be the main reason for lack of usage: the fact that one third of robbed traders
went to the police and 11% went to court do not suggest reluctance for legal institutions
per se. What the data therefore indicates is that contractual obligations are largely seen
as outside the purview of the law -- with the possible exception of non-payment.
This interpretation begs the question of what is the alternative contract enforcement
mechanism: if legal institutions offer little or not protection against opportunistic breach,
why do surveyed traders bother to place orders and grant credit at all? One thing that is
quite clear from interviews is that coercion is not seen as a common or even correct way
of resolving contractual disputes. If anything, recourse to courts and police is low
because traders perceive these institutions to be too antagonistic and conﬂictual. Refer-
ence to ’trust’ is the most common answer when traders are asked why contracts are
honored. To understand what ’trust’ means to Malagasy traders, we investigate what hap-
pens in dispute cases. The ﬁrst striking ﬁnding is that most contractual disputes are
resolved (85% of supplier cases and 79% of client cases) and trade is resumed in most
cases (91% of supplier cases and 78% of client cases). In addition, dispute resolution and
resumption of trade are highly correlated; 79% of disputes with suppliers and 73% of
disputes with clients are resolved and trade resumed. Similar ﬁndings are reported for
African manufacturers in Fafchamps (1996) and Bigsten et al. (1999).
This suggests that breach of contract, although unwelcome and costly for respon-
dents, occurs within the context of long term relationships. A reasonable interpretation,
largely conﬁrmed by informal discussions with respondents and casual observation, is
that parties implicitly agree to continue trading with each other as long as contractual
breach remains infrequent and provided that, when it occurs, a good faith effort is made
to resolve the situation. If these conditions are satisﬁed, the relationship continues; other-
wise it is severed. In other words, relational contracting as modeled for instance by
Ghosh and Ray (1996) and Fafchamps (1998a) is the key contract enforcement mechan-
ism.14 
This interpretation is conﬁrmed by regression analysis. Table 12 for instance shows
that more personalized relations and longer acquaintance with suppliers and clients is
associated with efforts to resolve contractual disputes through direct negotiation and, in
the case of clients, through mediators. A contrario, regression results also indicate that
respondents with relatives in agricultural trade are much less likely to negotiate payment
problems with clients. Although a priori surprising, this ﬁnding is consistent with the idea
that disciplining relatives is difﬁcult: if so, why bother waste time negotiating with them.
Table 13 and 14 further illustrate that direct negotiations have a strong positive effect on
the probability of resolving the dispute and resuming trade. In other words, good faith
efforts to iron out difﬁculties are essential to the preservation of trust and relationships.
Results again show that payment problems are less likely to be resolved for respondents
who have relatives in agricultural trade -- and who presumably buy and sell from them.
The reader may want to know whether relational contracting as enforcement
mechanism is complemented by information sharing on cheaters and by collusion to
exclude them from future trade, as suggested for instance by Kandori (1992), Greif
(1993), and others. Table 15 provides some useful information in this respect. We see
that, of those traders who obtain supplier credit, less than one ﬁfth come recommended
by other traders. The dominant credit screening procedure is to purchase several times
from the same trader, thereby establishing mutual trust. The most common action taken
in response to non payment is to stop deliveries. Similar ﬁndings are reported by
Fafchamps (1996) for Ghana. Very few respondents expect to involve the police or the
courts in debt collection, hence conﬁrming that the trade relationship constitutes its own
collateral. There is some information sharing about clients who do not pay but its reach is
limited: a majority of respondents estimate that a client who does not pay is either
unlikely or very unlikely to lose credit from other suppliers. Exclusion from future trade
credit is thus not the dominant form of contract enforcement, although it plays a secon-
dary role.
These ﬁndings are further conﬁrmed by Table 16. Clients themselves are the main
source of information on which suppliers rely before granting credit. For two third of the
respondents, this is the only source of information on which they rely for screening trade
credit applicants. Only a quarter of the respondents obtain information from other
traders; 14% obtain information from other sources. There appears to be no systematic
effort to share information on clients who do not pay: only 13% of credit givers discuss
bad clients with other traders once of month or more; one quarter never discuss bad
clients at all.
Why there is not more information sharing is unclear. One may be tempted to
assume that the ethnic origin of traders is too heterogeneous to allow a ﬂuid exchange of
information (e.g., Cornell and Welch (1996), La Ferrara (1997)). This is not borne out by
the data, however. First, all surveyed traders -- like all inhabitant of Madagascar -- speak
a single common language. Second, traders operate predominantly in their region of ori-
gin: over 85% of traders operate in the district (Fivondronana) of their birth, and the
coefﬁcient of correlation between the postal code of their place of birth and the location
of their trading activity is as high as 0.76. Only 9 traders in the sample are of foreign ori-
gin -- mostly from Asia. Finally, the overwhelming majority of respondents -- 91% --
share a common religion. The idea that linguistic, ethnic, or religious barriers prevent the
circulation of information cannot, therefore, be sustained.15 
One item of information that is worth pointing out is that riots against traders took
place in the late 1980’s. According to Lonely Planet (1994), "Indo-Pakistani traders []
bore the brunt of Malagasy violence in the 1987 riots. [T]he Indian premises on either
sides [of the main street in Tulear] along with most of the central area were gutted"
(p.220). Blanchy (1995) reports that in ﬁve major cities, Asian-owned shops were looted
and burned; many Asians feared for their life and ﬂed the country, if only temporarily.
Barrett (1997b) reports that Asian traders refused to be interviewed by Malagasy
enumerators and writes that "[it] is difﬁcult to overstate the sensitivity of ethnic Asian
food marketing intermediaries to the political risks of their trade". Judging from
Blanchy’s (1995) account of Asian businesses in Madagascar, ethnic Asian business net-
works prior to the riots resembled their counterparts in Kenya (e.g., Himbara (1994),
Marris (1971), Fafchamps (1998b), Fafchamps et al. (1994)). If, as it is likely, Asian
traders have pulled out of grain markets to reduce their exposure to political risk, the
resulting disruption in existing business networks could explain the current lack of
sophistication of grain trade in the country. Still, this does not explain why indigenous
networks of information sharing have not formed to replace Asian networks. These issues
deserve more research.
Conclusions
This paper has studied liberalized grain markets in Madagascar and examines how
property rights are protected and contracts are enforced among agricultural traders. We
found that the incidence of theft and breach of contract is low and that the losses result-
ing from such instances are small. This, however, does not result from reliance on legal
institutions -- actual recourse to police and courts is fairly rare, except in cases of theft --
but from traders’ reluctance to expose themselves to opportunism. Judging from the evi-
dence collected, the indirect costs of malfeasance prevention are likely to be much
higher than the direct costs of theft and breach of contract. As a result, Malagasy grain
trade resembles the occasional ﬂea markets of American cities, with little or no forward
contracting and high transactions costs.
We also investigated how contracts are enforced. We found that the dominant con-
tract enforcement mechanism is trust-based relationships. Trust is established primarily
through repeated interaction with little role for referral by other traders. Information on
bad clients does not circulate widely, hence severely limiting group punishments for non
payment. As far as we are able to judge, the lack of information sharing does not result
from the existence of linguistic, ethnic, or religious obstacles to communication. In spite
of great diversity in external appearance, Malagasy society is surprisingly homogeneous.
Rather, the culprit might be sought in the disruption of pre-existing Asian networks that
followed food riots in the late 1980’s. More research is needed to assess why native net-
works did not emerge in their stead and what institutional changes can improve Malagasy
grain markets.
Results indicate that Malagasy grain traders make very little use of the justice sys-
tem. For policy purposes, it would be important to know whether this situation arises
because they lack access to the law (cost issue) or because they wish to avoid legal
delays and uncertainties (time and risk issues). Cost issues could in principle be handled
through a subsidy or small claims courts system,26 while reducing judicial delays and
_ ______________
26 Another possibility is to expand the current Malagasy system of itinerant judges called audiences
foraines, as discussed in The World Bank (1995) and Ministère de la Justice (1999).16 
legal uncertainty probably requires hiring more judges and changing the law.27 Existing
reports on the Malagasy justice system (e.g., Root (1993), Ministère de la Justice (1999),
The World Bank (1995)) fail to identify which types of policy intervention should
receive priority.28 Unfortunately, given the extremely small number of legal recourses
recorded in the survey, the data cannot distinguish which of these issues really matters
for Malagasy traders.29 Based upon the available secondary evidence, we suspect that
the cost of the justice system is more problematic for grain traders than legal risk and
delays which, for simple cases of theft or non-payment, are likely to be small. This
interpretation ﬁnds additional support in the fact that recourse to the law is much more
likely in cases of theft than commercial disputes: criminal proceedings are typically
cheaper for plaintiffs than commercial cases because police and public prosecutors bear
much if not all of the costs of collecting evidence and arguing the legality of the case.
Speculation should not, however, hide the fact that our limited data do not clearly estab-
lish what kind of judicial reform Madagascar needs most.
_ ______________
27 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. Judging by the alleged prevalence of
corruption in the Malagasy justice system and police, and the suspicion that much of it is a kind of fee-
for-service, perhaps the simplest subsidy would be to pay judges, legal clerks, and policemen better -- a
recommendation that is already made by Root (1993) and The World Bank (1995).
28 Ministère de la Justice (1999) reports that 20% and 56% of survey respondents blame high costs for
not going to court and not hiring lawyers, respectively. Respondents also unanimously praise itinerant
audience foraines whereby judges travel to market towns to administer justice -- a system that singularly
reduces travel costs for plaintiffs. But the report also documents respondents’ concerns about judicial
delays, legal uncertainty, and fear of reprisal.
29 With enough data and with suitable instruments for wealth (cost issue), time preference (delays), and
risk preference (uncertainty issue), regression analysis should in principle be able disentangle which of the
three main issues affect traders’ propensity to use the justice system.17 
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1994.Table 1. Characteristics of Surveyed Traders
Std. dev. Mean Unit A. Dependent variables
102087 39337 US $ (1) Total annual sales of agricultural food products
21731 5862 US $ (1) Total annual value added
B. Capital and equipment
7635 2061 US $ (1) Working capital
4.7% Yes=1 Dummy if subsidiary
2088 399 US $ (1) Value of equipment
134 26 Metric tons Storage capacity
0.50 0.14 Number Number of vehicles
16.2% Yes=1 Utilization of telephone
C. Labor and management
131.8 39.5 Month/year Manpower (in months/year)
87.3% Yes=1 Dummy if full time trader
83.4% Yes=1 Dummy if trader all year round
3.5 9.1 Years Years of schooling of owner/manager
4.5 6.0 Years Years of experience in agricultural trade
42.8% Yes=1 Commonly speaks a language other than national language
45.7% Female=1 Gender of trader
D. Social capital
1.2 0.7 Number Number of relatives in agric. trade
9.1 8.8 Number Number of traders known
1.7 2.3 Number Number of people who can help
7.6 4.6 Number Number of suppliers known personally
14.2 8.6 Number Number of clients known personally
E. Location
15.7% Yes=1 In capital city
31.3% Yes=1 In another city
19.9% Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
24.9% Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
11.5% Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
12.2% Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
13.4% Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
(1) Computed using an exchange rate of 5000 Francs Malgaches for 1 US$.Table 2. Incidence of Theft and Breach of Contract
Max. Min. Mean 1. Theft
7.70% Traders who experienced theft in last 12 months
93.0% 0.0% 0.28% Value of stolen goods relative to annual sales
2. Late delivery by suppliers
8.81% Traders who experienced late delivery in last 12 months
100.0% 0.0% 1.56% Proportion of late deliveries in total transactions
3. Deficient quality of deliveries by suppliers
20.60% Traders who experienced deficient quality in last 12 months
100.0% 0.0% 4.44% Proportion of deficient quality deliveries in total transactions
4. Late payment by clients
30.80% Traders who experienced late payment in last 12 months
100.0% 0.0% 1.91% Proportion of late payments in total transactions
5. Non-payment by clients
6.82% Traders who experienced non payment in last 12 months
4.2% 0.0% 0.04% Proportion of non payments in total transactions
Note: the exact number of valid observations varies somewhat from question to question
(from 728 to 738).Table 3. Exposure to Theft and Prevention
8% Traders who experienced a theft in last 12 months
Of those who experienced a theft:
42%    % who experienced theft at store during the day
40%    % who experienced theft from storage at night
18%    % who experienced theft during transport/consignment
Of those who experienced a theft:
32%    % who think theft was not due to employee
37%    % who suspect an employee
26%    % who do not know
37% Traders who refrain from hiring workers for fear of theft
72% Traders who leave stocks overnight at sales location
Of those who stock overnight:
99%    % with lock on storage location
64%    % who sleep on premices
52%    % who hire a guard 
95%    % who either sleep on premices or hire a guard
41% Traders who transport goods from one town to another
Of those who transport:
4%    % who avoid certain locations for fear of theft during transport
14%    % who pay someone for protecting goods in transport
30%    % who travel in convoy
43%    % who either pay for protection or travel in convoyTable 4.  Variation of Quality and Inspection by Trader
Traders' assessment of quality variation
1. Whether prices vary with product quality
33% A lot
61% A little bit
7% Not at all
2. Whether product quality varies by region of origin:
37% A lot
57% A little bit
6% Not at all
3. Whether product quality varies within region of origin:
5% Always
14% Often
37% Sometimes
36% Seldom
7% Never
Average price differential between C1 and C2 quality rice (a):
9% Retail price
8% Wholesale price
Verification of quality before purchase:
1. Trader verifies quality:
84% Always
13% Often
2% Sometimes
1% Never
2. The person who verifies quality is:
93% Trader himself/herself
4% Family helper
2% Employee or collecting agent
1% Nobody
3. Client verifies quality:
85% Always
11% Often
2% Sometimes
2% Never
(a) Source: National Statistical Bureau, computed from dayly price figures of
Antananarivo, 1997.Table 5. Exposure and Incidence
1. Theft and storage
p-value t-stat. No Yes Trader leaves stocks overnight on sales location
0.0578 -1.9016 0.00% 0.38% Value of stolen goods relative to annual sales
198 526 Number of observations
2. Theft and transport
p-value t-stat. No Yes Trader transports goods from one location to another
0.9786 -0.0268 0.28% 0.28% Value of stolen goods relative to annual sales
423 307 Number of observations
3. Late delivery by suppliers
p-value t-stat. No Yes Trader places orders with suppliers
0.0000 -5.8100 0.00% 10.55% Proportion of transactions with late delivery
620 108 Number of observations
4. Deficient quality of deliveries by suppliers
p-value t-stat. No Yes Trader always inspects quality of supplies
0.3660 0.9070 5.76% 4.19% Proportion of transactions with deficient quality
112 616 Number of observations
5. Late payment by clients
p-value t-stat. No Yes Trader grants credit to at least some clients
0.0000 -4.3800 0.33% 3.77% Proportion of transactions with late payment
396 336 Number of observations
6. Non-payment by clients
p-value t-stat. No Yes Trader grants credit to at least some clients
0.0200 -3.1191 0.00% 0.08% Proportion of transactions with non-payment
396 336 Number of observations
Note: Test of equality of variance rejected in all cases.  All t-tests conducted without assuming equality of variance.  Table 6. Determinants of the Incidence of Theft
The dependent variable is the value of annual losses due to theft divided by total annual sales.  Tobit
estimates reported.
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Exposure factors
p 2.370 0.297 a 4.356 0.465 Yes=1 Night storage at sales location
p 2.204 0.040 a 1.577 0.020 Log(x+1) Storage capacity
Trader characteristics
p 0.603 0.008 p -0.539 -0.008 p 2.274 0.029 Value Total sales
-1.094 -0.005 -0.439 -0.002 0.108 0.000 Value Years of schooling
-1.585 -0.038 -0.980 -0.023 -0.887 -0.021 Log(x+1) Years of experience
Location dummies
-0.614 -0.044 -1.176 -0.079 -1.136 -0.082 Yes=1 In capital city
-0.600 -0.022 -0.829 -0.030 -0.844 -0.031 Yes=1 In another urban location
-0.693 -0.051 -1.073 -0.074 -1.225 -0.091 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-1.119 -0.081 -1.372 -0.095 -1.473 -0.108 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
0.200 0.016 -0.921 -0.068 -1.291 -0.100 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
1.738 0.233 2.225 0.242 -1.215 -0.102 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
1.455 0.169 1.415 0.122 -1.031 -0.079 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
-2.995 -0.541 -2.709 -0.508 -2.912 -0.463 Intercept
0.176 0.169 0.181 Selection-term
672 672 672 Number of observations
92% 92% 92% % zero observations
0.1416 0.2901 0.0619 Pseudo R-square
Notes: a = actual value used as regressor.  p = predicted value used as regressor. See text for details.Table 7. Determinants of the Incidence of Late Delivery by Suppliers
The dependent variable is the proportion of late deliveries in total purchase transactions.
Tobit estimates reported.
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Exposure factors
p 3.551 1.085 a Yes=1 Respondent places orders
Trader characteristics
p -0.178 -0.006 p -1.345 -0.044 p -0.160 -0.005 Value Total sales
0.158 0.002 0.451 0.004 0.868 0.009 Value Years of schooling
-0.664 -0.033 -0.199 -0.009 -0.730 -0.036 Log(x+1) Years of experience
0.976 0.060 0.031 0.002 2.590 0.153 Log(x+1) # relatives in agricultural trade
-0.156 -0.008 0.401 0.019 1.497 0.071 Log(x+1) # suppliers known personally
Location dummies
0.783 0.135 0.435 0.061 0.147 0.024 Yes=1 Antananarivo
-0.221 -0.020 0.937 0.082 -0.503 -0.044 Yes=1 Other urban location
-0.255 -0.044 -1.498 -0.208 -0.834 -0.137 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-0.665 -0.125 -2.095 -0.311 -1.850 -0.323 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-0.385 -0.077 -1.381 -0.226 -1.612 -0.298 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-0.940 -0.209 -2.043 -0.413 -1.520 -0.330 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
. -2.222 . -1.813 . -2.364 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
-1.576 -0.621 1.650 0.604 -1.298 -0.503 Intercept
0.408 0.253 0.415 Selection-term
669 100 669 Number of observations
91% 43% 91% % zero observations
0.237 0.350 0.1908 Pseudo R-square
Notes: a = late deveries not observed when no orders are placed.  p = predicted value used as regressor.
See text for details.Table 8. Determinants of the Incidence of Deficient Quality Deliveries by Suppliers
The dependent variable is the proportion of deficient quality deliveries in total purchase transactions. Tobit
estimates reported.
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Exposure factors
p 0.642 0.024 a 1.207 0.045 Code (c) Verification of quality
Trader characteristics
p 0.159 0.004 p 0.214 0.005 p 0.306 0.007 Value Total sales
-1.170 -0.008 -1.158 -0.008 -1.124 -0.008 Value Years of schooling
-1.804 -0.061 -1.895 -0.064 -1.870 -0.063 Log(x+1) Years of experience
3.624 0.178 4.123 0.167 3.988 0.160 Log(x+1) # relatives in agricultural trade
1.303 0.043 1.353 0.044 1.190 0.039 Log(x+1) # suppliers known personally
Location dummies
-0.373 -0.044 -0.291 -0.033 -0.243 -0.028 Yes=1 Antananarivo
-0.137 -0.008 -0.247 -0.014 -0.350 -0.020 Yes=1 Other urban location
0.685 0.080 0.841 0.096 0.842 0.097 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-3.035 -0.384 -2.976 -0.370 -2.965 -0.370 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-1.955 -0.253 -1.883 -0.238 -1.857 -0.236 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-2.920 -0.490 -2.983 -0.495 -3.049 -0.507 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
. -2.137 . -2.145 . -2.163 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
-0.322 -0.089 -0.769 -0.197 -0.614 -0.157 Intercept
0.353 0.352 0.354 Selection-term
669 669 669 Number of observations
79% 79% 79% % zero observations
0.328 0.330 0.327 Pseudo R-square
Notes: a = actual value used as regressor.  p = predicted value used as regressor. See text for details.
Code (c) as follows: 1 = always verifies quality; 2 = often; 3 = sometimes; 4 = rarely; 5 = never.Table 9. Determinants of the Incidence of Late Payment by Clients
The dependent variable is the proportion of late payments in total sales transactions. Tobit estimates
reported.
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Exposure factors
p 2.491 0.189 a 7.579 0.433 Share Credit sales in total sales
Trader characteristics
p 1.684 0.018 p 0.060 0.001 p 2.519 0.026 Value Total sales
-0.111 -0.000 0.318 0.001 0.138 0.000 Value Years of schooling
0.463 0.008 0.431 0.007 1.401 0.024 Log(x+1) Years of experience
1.556 0.030 1.244 0.024 1.428 0.028 Log(x+1) # relatives in agricultural trade
0.161 0.002 1.085 0.014 1.254 0.016 Log(x+1) # clients known personally
Location dummies
-2.356 -0.149 -2.402 -0.140 -3.370 -0.201 Yes=1 Antananarivo
-1.761 -0.047 -1.180 -0.031 -2.135 -0.057 Yes=1 Other urban location
-1.051 -0.066 -0.869 -0.050 -1.946 -0.115 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-4.062 -0.249 -4.509 -0.265 -4.621 -0.279 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-3.412 -0.215 -3.711 -0.223 -3.995 -0.247 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-2.955 -0.227 -3.100 -0.217 -4.169 -0.298 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
-3.407 -0.255 -3.658 -0.246 -4.842 -0.332 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
-1.330 -0.171 -0.699 -0.087 -2.126 -0.263 Intercept
0.192 0.184 0.192 Selection-term
672 672 672 Number of observations
69% 69% 69% % zero observations
0.330 0.485 0.313 Pseudo R-square
Notes: a = actual value used as regressor.  p = predicted value used as regressor. See text for details.Table 10. Determinants of the Incidence of Non-Payment by Clients
The dependent variable is the proportion of non-payments in total sales transactions. Tobit estimates
reported.
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Exposure factors
p -0.330 -0.003 a 1.762 0.013 Share Credit sales in total sales
Trader characteristics
p 1.916 0.003 p 1.237 0.002 p 1.910 0.002 Value Total sales
1.746 0.001 1.817 0.001 1.723 0.001 Value Years of schooling
0.307 0.001 0.059 0.000 0.203 0.000 Log(x+1) Years of experience
2.203 0.005 2.146 0.005 2.194 0.005 Log(x+1) # relatives in agricultural trade
-0.963 -0.002 -1.293 -0.002 -1.271 -0.002 Log(x+1) # clients known personally
Location dummies
-1.593 -0.010 -1.237 -0.007 -1.597 -0.009 Yes=1 Antananarivo
-0.802 -0.003 -0.555 -0.002 -0.770 -0.003 Yes=1 Other urban location
-2.368 -0.016 -2.067 -0.013 -2.431 -0.015 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-3.536 -0.024 -3.394 -0.022 -3.588 -0.023 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-3.415 -0.025 -3.279 -0.023 -3.456 -0.024 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-2.745 -0.027 -2.504 -0.023 -2.818 -0.025 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
-2.996 -0.027 -2.798 -0.024 -3.151 -0.026 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
-2.469 -0.040 -2.162 -0.034 -2.506 -0.038 Intercept
0.015 0.015 0.015 Selection-term
672 672 672 Number of observations
93% 93% 93% % zero observations
-3.442 -3.631 -3.436 Pseudo R-square
Notes: a = actual value used as regressor.  p = predicted value used as regressor. See text for details.Table 11. Recourse to Legal Institutions
A. Theft:
37.5% Trader sought help of the police
10.7% Trader went to court
57 Number of observations:
B. Disputes with clients and suppliers:
Traders who ever used the following in a dispute with client or supplier:
14.0% A third party as mediator or arbitrator
4.0% The police
0.6% A lawyer
0.7% A court
729 Number of observations:
Conflict resolution methods used during the last incidence of: 
1. Breach of contract by supplier:
86.0% Trader negotiated directly with supplier
3.4% Trader sought help of mediator
0.0% Trader sought help of lawyer
0.0% Trader threatened to go to the police
0.6% Trader threatened to go to court
178 Number of observations:
2. Breach of contract by client:
93.6% Trader negotiated directly with client
9.1% Trader sought help of mediator
0.5% Trader sought help of lawyer
3.6% Trader threatened to go to the police
0.9% Trader threatened to go to court
220 Number of observations:Table 12.  Determinants of Choice of Dispute Resolution Method
Probit estimates reported.
  Dispute with:   Dispute with:
  Client   Supplier
Use of Mediator Direct negotiation   Direct negotiation Dependent variable
Yes=1 Yes=1 Yes=1 Value
z stat Coef. z stat Coef. z stat Coef. Characteristics of transaction:
n.a. n.a. 0.616 0.196 Yes=1 Case of deficient quality
3.273 0.738 1.185 0.072 4.418 0.216 Log(x+1) Length of relationship
-0.968 -0.094 4.974 0.227 1.991 0.055 Log(x+1) Amount paid (supplier)/ due (client)
Characteristic of trader
1.991 0.231 1.057 0.132 -0.961 -0.118 Log(x) Total sales
-1.927 -0.505 -3.457 -0.792 -1.058 -0.234 Log(x+1) # relatives in agricultural trade
0.531 0.104 1.846 0.383 1.729 0.332 Log(x+1) # suppliers/clients known personally
-3.849 -7.512 -2.147 -3.163 0.666 0.918 Intercept
246 246 180 Number of observations
0.215 0.522 0.229 Pseudo R-squareTable 13. Determinants of Conflict Resolution with Suppliers
Probit estimates reported.
Trade is resumed (Yes=1) Dispute is resolved (Yes=1)
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Method of dispute resolution
1.887 0.793 4.585 2.805 Yes=1 Direct negotiations with supplier
Characteristics of transaction
0.706 0.232 0.596 0.191 -1.335 -0.538 -1.912 -0.711 Yes=1 Dispute is about quality
-0.962 -0.053 -0.414 -0.021 -0.185 -0.011 0.751 0.036 Log(x+1) Days of trade with supplier
-1.022 -0.027 -0.933 -0.025 -1.363 -0.040 -1.454 -0.037 Log(x+1) Amount already paid to supplier
Characteristics of trader
1.982 0.304 1.798 0.259 2.747 0.458 2.177 0.299 Value Total annual sales
0.328 0.076 0.230 0.054 -1.311 -0.326 -1.623 -0.333 Log(x+1) # relatives in agricultural trade
0.286 0.060 0.639 0.129 0.663 0.175 1.680 0.364 Log(x+1) # suppliers known personally
-1.523 -2.645 -1.068 -1.696 -2.861 -5.879 -1.278 -2.012 Intercept
171 171 167 167 Number of observations
0.081 0.049 0.412 0.177 Pseudo R-square
Note: Results give the outcome of a contractual dispute conditional on a dispute having occurred.Table 14. Determinants of Conflict Resolution with Clients
Probit estimates reported.
Trade is resumed (Yes=1) Dispute is resolved (Yes=1)
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. Method of dispute resolution
3.743 1.680 3.851 2.375 Direct negotiations with client
-2.650 -0.925 -2.943 -1.042 Recourse to third-party mediator
-2.805 -2.014 -0.968 -0.536 Recourse to lawyer
Characteristics of transaction
-1.227 -0.065 -1.366 -0.064 -0.299 -0.016 -0.586 -0.028 Log(x+1) Days of trade with client
-2.864 -0.136 -1.381 -0.056 0.758 0.052 0.783 0.048 Log(x+1) Value of the sales transaction
Characteristics of trader
0.913 0.079 0.413 0.033 0.313 0.031 0.457 0.040 Value Total annual sales
-2.604 -0.501 -2.937 -0.481 -2.696 -0.571 -3.555 -0.614 Log(x+1) # relatives in agricultural trade
2.810 0.491 2.617 0.397 3.781 0.713 3.697 0.603 Log(x+1) # clients known personally
-0.393 -0.402 0.792 0.746 -2.589 -3.288 -0.923 -0.975 Intercept
231 235 222 223 Number of observations
0.244 0.077 0.286 0.122 Pseudo R-square
Note: Results give the outcome of a contractual dispute conditional on a dispute having occurred.Table 15. Trade Credit
With With
Clients Suppliers A. Procedure to obtain/grant supplier credit
72.4% 83.0% Purchase several times
9 7     in which case, how many times
17.1% 11.3% Be referred by another trader
2.4% 1.5% Provide a bank guarantee or give a deposit
1.8% 0.5% Fill in forms
Client Supplier B. Action taken in case of non payment
88.9% 77.7% Stop deliveries
4.4% 1.6% Go to the police
1.8% 0.5% Go to court
Client Supplier C. Loss of credit with other suppliers
20.9% 11.3% Very unlikely
58.7% 40.2% Unlikely
15.4% 31.4% Likely
4.9% 17.0% Very likely
342 195 Number of observations
Note: Data collected only from respondents who receive or give supplier credTable 16. Screening of Potential Trade Credit Recipients
A. Source of information on client
95.9% Obtain information from client himself/herself
24.0% Obtain information from other traders
12.3% Obtain information from other sources
1.2% Obtain information from client's bank
B. Information sharing with other traders about bad clients
1.5% Once a day
1.7% Once a week
10.1% Once a month
62.6% Occasionally
24.1% Never
344 Number of observations:
Note: Data collected only from respondents who give credit to clients.Appendix A. Instrumenting Regression for Total Sales
t stat. Coef. A. Capital and equipment
6.720 0.209 Log(x) Working capital
5.018 1.072 Yes=1 Dummy if subsidiary
1.656 0.042 Log(x+1) Value of equipment
3.932 0.174 Log(x+1) Storage capacity
-0.955 -0.210 Log(x+1) Number of vehicles
2.613 0.368 Yes=1 Utilization of telephone
B. Labor and management
1.880 0.010 Value Age of trader
-1.269 -0.115 Male=1 Sexe of trader
5.394 0.515 Log(x) Manpower (in months/year)
-1.412 -0.255 share % family labor in total labor force
0.909 0.138 Yes=1 Dummy if full time trader
2.833 0.394 Yes=1 Dummy if trader all year round
1.614 0.026 Level Years of schooling of owner/manager
0.268 0.020 Log(x+1) Years of experience in agricultural trade
-1.373 -0.156 Yes=1 Speaks another language
C. Social capital
-2.186 -0.225 Log(x+1) Number of relatives in agric. trade
1.994 0.137 Log(x+1) Number of traders known
3.541 0.307 Log(x+1) Number of people who can help
0.852 0.053 Log(x+1) Number of suppliers known personally
1.695 0.104 Log(x+1) Number of clients known personally
D. Entrepreneur's wealth
-0.683 -0.000 Log(x+1) Value of home
E. Entrepreneur's attitude
-2.448 -0.145 Index Propensity to invest in business
-2.665 -0.103 Index Propensity to save
-0.593 -0.023 Index Propensity to spend on durables
-1.048 -0.063 Index Individualism
-0.305 -0.016 Index Altruism
F. Entrepreneur's family background
-0.362 -0.045 Yes=1 Father has primary education
0.567 0.071 Yes=1 Mother has primary education
1.314 0.196 Yes=1 Father has secondary education
0.305 0.056 Yes=1 Mother has secondary education
1.183 0.110 Log(x+1) Father's years of trade experience
-1.272 -0.124 Log(x+1) Mother's years of trade experience
-0.411 -0.050 Log(x+1) Father's years of ag. trade exper.
0.024 0.003 Log(x+1) Mother's years of ag. trade exper.
0.197 0.006 Log(x+1) Number of adult brothers 
2.608 0.081 Log(x+1) Number of adult sisters
F. Shocks
1.985 0.161 Ratio Aggregate sales shock
G. Location
-1.591 -0.566 Yes=1 In capital city
2.240 0.272 Yes=1 In another city
-1.384 -0.457 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-3.100 -1.140 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-2.786 -1.043 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-0.979 -0.388 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
-2.404 -0.939 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
10.465 6.552 Intercept
672 Number of observations
0.620 R-squaredAppendix B:  Determinants of Exposure to Risk
Share of Quality Placement of Overnight Storage
credit purchases verification orders storage capacity
Share Rank from 1 to 4 Yes=1 Yes=1 Log(x+1) Dependent variable:
2-limit tobit Ordered probit Probit Probit Tobit Estimator:
t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. A. Wealth
2.364 0.000 -0.731 -0.000 -1.031 -0.000 2.427 0.000 8.055 0.000 Value Value of home
B. Human capital
0.370 0.001 0.512 0.004 2.075 0.017 1.515 0.019 5.292 0.033 Value Age of trader
-1.392 -0.033 1.218 0.169 -0.298 -0.041 -0.328 -0.068 -1.777 -0.190 Male=1 Sexe of trader
1.672 0.007 0.538 0.014 1.236 0.027 1.363 0.049 2.254 0.038 Value Years of schooling
2.940 0.062 -0.726 -0.098 0.059 0.007 0.384 0.071 0.478 0.043 Log(x+1) Years of trade experience
C. Social network capital
-1.267 -0.034 -4.218 -0.722 1.058 0.154 0.419 0.115 0.306 0.038 Log(x+1) # relatives in ag. trade
2.135 0.039 -1.093 -0.122 -2.274 -0.229 -0.546 -0.093 -0.849 -0.069 Log(x+1) # traders known
1.088 0.025 1.729 0.254 -0.085 -0.011 2.127 0.432 0.576 0.060 Log(x+1) # people who can help
-1.929 -0.030 -1.664 -0.157 3.409 0.329 0.096 0.013 2.473 0.180 Log(x+1) # suppliers known pers.
4.860 0.082 1.778 0.180 0.327 0.030 1.285 0.188 1.019 0.074 Log(x+1) # clients known pers.
D. Personal traits
-3.117 -0.051 -1.939 -0.224 -0.829 -0.076 1.598 0.206 2.640 0.182 Index Propensity to invest in business
-5.383 -0.053 -3.261 -0.204 1.021 0.056 -1.420 -0.127 -0.219 -0.010 Index Propensity to save
-1.710 -0.017 -1.933 -0.114 -0.783 -0.043 -0.422 -0.038 -1.353 -0.062 Index Propensity to spend on durables
0.841 0.013 -1.648 -0.169 1.403 0.118 -1.068 -0.150 0.699 0.050 Index Individualism
-1.234 -0.017 0.144 0.012 -3.288 -0.261 2.743 0.373 -0.646 -0.040 Index Altruism
E. Family background
0.602 0.020 0.362 0.078 1.571 0.301 0.500 0.155 0.614 0.091 Yes=1 Father has primary education
-0.312 -0.011 0.707 0.146 -1.726 -0.326 -1.849 -0.590 -1.254 -0.189 Yes=1 Mother has primary education
-0.250 -0.010 0.001 0.000 2.446 0.556 0.132 0.046 1.992 0.358 Yes=1 Father has high school educ.
0.422 0.021 1.256 0.369 -1.507 -0.422 -0.344 -0.144 1.043 0.230 Yes=1 Mother has high school educ.
-0.286 -0.007 -1.380 -0.189 -0.356 -0.046 2.439 0.461 0.013 0.002 Log(x+1) Father's years of trade experience
0.639 0.015 2.552 0.341 1.280 0.164 -1.688 -0.283 0.212 0.026 Log(x+1) Mother's years of trade experience
0.954 0.028 1.085 0.184 0.628 0.101 -3.062 -0.751 -0.467 -0.070 Log(x+1) Father's years of ag. trade exper.
-0.883 -0.026 -2.251 -0.373 -1.117 -0.175 2.523 0.584 0.775 0.114 Log(x+1) Mother's years of ag. trade exper.
2.172 0.017 1.467 0.075 -0.232 -0.011 1.732 0.125 -2.125 -0.076 Value Number of adult brothers
3.613 0.030 -0.805 -0.042 -1.187 -0.055 -1.215 -0.087 -0.200 -0.008 Value Number of adult sisters
F. Location
-3.528 -0.300 -0.152 -0.097 0.443 0.213 -5.033 -4.614 0.914 0.379 Yes=1 In capital city
-1.162 -0.036 -1.943 -0.357 -0.055 -0.010 1.022 0.325 -0.986 -0.139 Yes=1 In another urban location
-3.916 -0.313 0.433 0.265 0.322 0.143 -4.713 -4.626 0.804 0.315 Yes=1 In Vakinankaratra region
-2.389 -0.210 0.088 0.058 -0.048 -0.024 -5.117 -5.065 0.913 0.389 Yes=1 In Fianar/hauts plateaux region
-2.574 -0.227 0.304 0.198 -0.344 -0.174 -6.079 -6.029 -0.979 -0.420 Yes=1 In Fianar/cotes et falaise region
-4.165 -0.416 -1.249 -0.955 0.727 0.400 -8.942 -9.513 -2.282 -1.044 Yes=1 In Majunga/plaines region
-4.943 -0.460 -1.933 -1.413 -0.212 -0.113 -9.031 -8.976 -0.555 -0.240 Yes=1 In Majunga/plateaux region
1.037 0.136 -0.363 -2.247 -1.675 . 4.546 -0.687 -0.420 Intercept
0.849 Second intercept (ordered probit only)
1.330 Third intercept (ordered probit only)
0.250 1.289 Selection-term (tobit only)
704 700 703 704 696 Number of observations
0.4607 0.2419 0.1471 0.7391 0.1224 Pseudo R-square